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Guest
Editorial

A Common Private Law for Europe?
It is fashionable among some schools of thought to give a special place to the role of the
so-called 'mixed systems' in the formation of a common law for the European Union.'
Others disagree, for one reason or another. 2 I wish to express hesitations though on
different grounds. I want once again to call attention to striking features of law that
militate against standard theories of law in society, especially of sociology of law, and
that should be relevant for future development. These features are: (a) the prevalence of
legal transplants; (b) the longevity of unsatisfactory rules that are detrimental to the
interests of the elite that has power to change the law; (c) the scarcity of legislation in
many areas of private law;3 (d) the importance of the need for authority to justify law.
My thesis is simple. These striking features must be treated as important for an
understanding of the development of law. They are interrelated, and should be
considered together.
Thus, legal transplants are a phenomenon resulting from the absence of legal authority
in the receiving state. The acceptance of foreign law is not haphazard, but neither is it
entirely rational. One system is habitually chosen as the donor whether because it is
believed to be similar, or is known to the recipient, or is regarded in general as
exhibiting the highest standards. The longevity of rules known to be unsatisfactory is
the result first of a failure of rulers to legislate, secondly of a search for authority in
one's own system. In the absence of up-to-date legislation judges look to old law. The
absence of legislation is because rulers have only one necessary, compelling,

1.

2.
3.

The debate has gone well beyond the boundaries of Europe. See, e.g. essays in D. Carey Miller and R.
Zimmerman (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law, (Duncker & Humblot, 1987); Mark Van
Hoecke and Frangois Ost (eds.), The Harmonization of European Private Law, (Hart Publishing,
2002); Jan Smits (ed.), The Contribution of Mixed Legal Systems to European Private Law,
(Intersentia, 2001).
See, e.g., Robin Evans-Jones, 'Mixed Legal Systems, Scotland and the Unification of Private Law in
Europe,' in Jan Smits (ed.), The ContributionofMixed Legal Systems to European PrivateLaw, 39
I need scarcely mention that my concern here is with private law.
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requirement: to remain in power. For this requirement much of law is irrelevant. Whole
areas of private law may thus be neglected for centuries. Even when legislation on the
grand scale occurs, it will frequently lack a precise message for law between members
of the community. What legislation there is on private law illuminates the need for
authority. One example from many, to be discussed shortly, is the Ten Commandments.
My conclusion is straightforward. A satisfactory private law for Europe is not primarily
to be sought for in the most common solutions, themselves the result of borrowing. Nor
in established rules, themselves the result of longevity, and lack of governmental
incentive in innovating. Nor should it be sought in intermediate positions of various
mixed systems, themselves the results of the features just above described. Rather it is
to be found in the need for authority.
This means that a common law for Europe requires the acceptance of a uniform system
of adjudicating differences within a standard framework of the necessary sources of
law. Authority is paramount, because it alone can constitute the common element. It
will not do if, in the absence of immediate pertinent legislation, French courts refer only
to the Code Civil and subsequent legislation, and English courts rely on judicial
precedents sometimes already several centuries old. Mixed systems will not supply an
answer to this need for authority.
II
I will not set out (once again) details of these particular features of private law. 4 But I
wish to exemplify aspects of them by discussion of one instance, the Ten
Commandments. My choice of example is dictated first by the extreme importance
attributed to the Ten Commandments, secondly by their remoteness from the European
Union.
Moses is a leader or ruler in trouble.5 God elected him to lead the Israelites from
bondage in Egypt to freedom, and appointed Aaron his spokesman before Pharaoh.6
With miracles from God, Moses led his people free. But the Israelites met constant
problems and blamed Moses, with Aaron in the background.8 The problems never
ceased. Moses was wearing himself out, even spending his days to his father-in-law's

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants, (University of Georgia Press, 1993); Alan Watson, Society and
Legal Change, (Temple University Press, 2001); Alan Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law,
(University of Georgia Press, 1991).
I am concerned not with historical truth but only with the traditional account in Exodus - enough for
our purposes.
Exodus 3. 7 ff.
Exodus 7.14 - 12.32.
Exodus 12.21ff.
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dismay in deciding lawsuits. 9 God intervened. Moses, and Moses alone, was to be given
the tablets of the laws by God with the people kept distant.' 0
Moses descended from the mountain with the laws and the worst had happened. The
people, with Aaron in the forefront, had rebelled against God. Moses, with God's
support in the laws, prevailed.
The commandments are a paradigm case for my argument. Moses, leader in trouble,
needs authority. His existing authority came from God. The new authority comes from
God, in the shape of laws. Some laws concern the relationship between God and his
people. Others, relations between humans. The former above all bolsters Moses
authority with his people. His authority depends on God, the laws support God, and they
are detailed. Laws regulating conduct between individuals are of no great concern.
Details of these cannot bolster Moses' authority. The laws are banal. No murder, no
theft, no adultery!" So what? The content of the law is not spelled out, nor are the
penalties. Even more, there is a law against coveting. Provisions against theft and
adultery are thus superfluous. The Ten Commandments, in the Exodus tradition, are a
paradigm example of legal development! Laws are needed to bolster the leader's
position; beyond that their content is irrelevant. Thus, the rules on humans' attitude to
God come first, are more specific and more exotic.
In the Ten Commandments legislation reveals its primary function: it confirms the
authority of the legislator.
III
If my arguments to this point make sense then the frequency of legal transplants, the
longevity of unsatisfactory legal rules and the paucity of legislation on many subjects,
all owe their being to the existence of a need for authority. The need for authority is
paramount in law.
For uniformity or harmonization in law, or an approach to such, then the need is not
primarily to be met by amalgamating systems through a notion of 'mixed systems', but
by authority that can be applied in all systems to all private law matters. If such
authority cannot be found the result for unification will be deeply flawed.
I should leave the argument here. It is one thing to contend that one has found the issue,
quite another to frame the means needed to achieve the desired result.

9.
10.
11.

Exodus 18.13
Exodus 19.9 ff.
See, e.g. Alan Watson, Authority of Law; and Law, forthcoming (Olin Foundation, 2003).

9 MJ 4 (2002)

331

HeinOnline -- 9 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 331 2002

Guest Editorial

IV
But I would like to make one suggestion. If my argument is correct that a common law
for the European Union demands a standard system of authority, then this need can only
be met by legislation which alone will be authoritative. A ius commune will not suffice.
Aggressive action is needed. Despite the usual lack of legislation for private law, a
uniform law for Europe demands it. And this can only be achieved by a common civil
code. The idea may be unpalatable in some jurisdictions, but it alone is workable.
Objections will be made. One, the system favours civil law jurisdictions. Two,
practitioners in common law jurisdictions will be disoriented. Three, the upheaval in
practice is insurmountable. Four, the task is simply impossible. I disagree.
One, yes, the system does seem to favour civil law jurisdictions. They already have civil
codes. But codification is a recent phenomenon. The French Code Civil dates only from
1804, the German BiirgerlichesGesetzbuch, only from 1900, the Turkish Tark Kanunu
Medenisi only from 1925. All these and the other codification's had to surmount
enormous obstacles: the proliferation of customary systems in France, the numerosity of
states in Germany, the absence of a civil law system in Ottoman Turkey. Similar
problems faced other systems that accepted civil codes.
Two, yes, practitioners will be disoriented. But so they were in the countries just
mentioned, but the system survived, and for private law seems to have flourished. It
must be accepted that adjustment will take time. But even in Turkey with enormous
changes the time taken for adjustment was not too long. 12 1 would envisage at the outset,
no drastic change in the law of procedure of individual countries. Lawyers of the old
school could cite precedent, juristic opinion and statute by way of argument. Judges, on
the other hand, in their decision would base themselves only on the civil code and
subsequent European Union legislation. Their interpretation would be moulded on the
arguments adduced. But inevitably legal argument would centre on what was an
acceptable interpretation of the civil code. Judges would be bound, advocates would be
freer. But inevitably advocates would tailor their arguments to the judges' needs.
Three, the upheaval in practice is easily surmountable. History proves this. 1 3
Four, the task is very possible. I would make three comments. First, the longevity of
unsatisfactory law shows, sadly, that society can live with imperfect law. Secondly,
codes, as we all know, can be framed to offer possible alternatives; spouses may be

12.
13.

See Esin OracGi, ConsideringParadoxesfor Legal Systems in Transition, (Kluwer, 1999).
For an instructive example consider the 1988 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods. See Franco Ferrari, InternationalSale of Goods, (Helbing & Lichtenhahn:
Bruylant, 1999).
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offered a choice of dowry or matrimonial property. Thirdly, while countries may differ
in their interpretation of articles of the code a superior European Union court can be
envisaged to harmonize the law.
V
Nothing written above should suggest that I do not feel that there is a special place for
mixed systems in the future for the European Union. There is. But that place has to be
put in context. If the way ahead is by codification then that role is secondary. It lies in
drafting articles that mediate between conflicting attitudes and, perhaps, in the structure
of the code. If the way ahead is by developing a ius commune then the role of mixed
systems should be greater. But that way has problems. It will inevitably be slow and
incomplete due to a lack of an established regime of authority. But that is perhaps no
bad thing. In Islamic law occurs the saying 'Difference of opinion is a sign of the
bounty of God.'
Alan Watson, Distinguished Research Professor and Ernest P. Rogers Professor of Law
at the University of Georgia School of Law.
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